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Abstract. In an incomplete market setting, we consider two financial agents, who
wish to price and trade a non-replicable contingent claim. Assuming that the agents
are utility maximizers, we propose a transaction price which is a result of the min-
imization of a convex combination of their utility differences. We call this price the
risk sharing price, we prove its existence for a large family of utility functions and
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where both agents report exponential utility.
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1. Introduction
Realistic financial markets are incomplete, as evidenced by empirical studies and manifested by
the difficulty or inability to replicate any contingent claim as a portfolio of traded assets. Thus,
the problems of contingent claim pricing and hedging in incomplete markets are of paramount
importance in mathematical finance. Seminal studies in the field of incomplete markets (see [32],
[14] for overviews in relevant topics) have led to an ever increasing research activity in this area,
that by now has allowed for a deeper understanding of the way that financial markets function. It
is well known for instance, that in an incomplete market setup there is no longer a unique pricing
kernel and this may at best point out a whole band of non-arbitrage prices for a contingent claim.
There is an extensive and very interesting literature focusing on the determination of the upper
and lower hedging prices (see e.g., [13], [11], [46] etc.). On the other hand though, further criteria
seem to be needed for the determination of the single price, out of the whole band of non-arbitrage
prices, at which the contingent claim will eventually be traded. The majority of such criteria, as
they have been proposed in the relevant literature, are based on, or related to, the minimization
of entropy-like functions (see e.g., [19], [18] etc.) and lead to subjective non-linear pricing rules.
However a complete theory on the procedure of price selection in incomplete markets is still missing.
The aim of this paper is to address the question of price selection in incomplete markets and provide
new ideas and insights, by proposing and elaborating on a “risk sharing” scenario involving two
financial agents who negotiate the price of a single indivisible non-replicable contingent claim.
We consider two agents, named “buyer” and “seller”, who are risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility maximizers and have access to some financial market that is liquid, incomplete and
arbitrage free. In our context, the agents’ utility functions are to be understood as benchmarks
that guide them to informed decision making; however, their final decisions are subject to further
“judgment” by the agents, so that departures from these benchmarks are meaningful and can be
considered. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the use of such utilities is not restrictive
for the purpose of this paper; as discussed in Section 5 our results can be generalized, using convex
or coherent risk measures (see [17] and [2] for the exact definitions of such measures) as decision
making rules instead of utility functions.
The utility maximization problem has captured an important part of the mathematical finance
literature (see e.g., [30], [9], [38], [43] etc). In these related papers, there is a main distinction of
utility functions into two types on the basis of their domain (see [43], Chapter 1). The first type
refers to those utility functions that are defined on wealth that may take values from the whole
real axis, while the utility functions of the second type are defined only for values of wealth on the
positive part of the real axis. In this work, we do not impose restrictions on the agents’ type of
utility function. In fact, the pricing scheme that we suggest below can be applied to both types of
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utility. However, for presentation purposes and in order to facilitate the reading of the paper, we
consider the case of utilities of the first type in the main body of the paper, while the technicalities
of utility functions of the second type are treated in the Appendix. We emphasize though that,
under the appropriate assumptions, whenever a utility function is considered in this paper, it can
be taken to be of either type.
At time 0 the two agents are determined to conclude a transaction on a contingent claim, by
agreeing on a price P immediately payable by the “buyer” to the “seller” in exchange of a non-
replicable contingent payoff B that is due from the seller to the buyer at the end of their common
and mutually beforehand agreed investment horizon T .
The incompleteness of the market dictates that there is an infinity of prices P that are consistent
with the absence of arbitrage. The main question that we address is the following:
“Out of this infinity of prices, which one will actually be realized?”
The incompleteness of the market means that the agents cannot fully hedge their positions in the
contingent claim B by trading in the market. Therefore, each of our agents resorts to (expected)
utility maximization criteria to produce a reference price that makes her indifferent between an
optimally invested portfolio that contains the position on the contingent claim and an optimally
invested portfolio without the position on the claim. Most probably however, the indifference price
of the “buyer” and the indifference price of the “seller” will not coincide (see e.g., [47], [3]). This
means that in order to agree on a common transaction price for the contingent claim, they should
depart somehow from the indifference prices that are dictated by their benchmark utility functions,
i.e., some “gain” or “loss” of indirect utility, which we call hereafter “risk” (see Remark 3.1 for
the justification of the choice of this term), should take place. Clearly, if the indifference price
of the seller is lower than the indifference price of the buyer, then by agreeing at any price in
between, they both experience some gain of utility, so they both undertake “negative risk”. In the
case however that the indifference price of the seller is higher than the indifference price of the
buyer, then by agreeing at any price in between, they both experience some loss in utility, i.e., they
undertake some “positive risk” with regard to their benchmark utility functions. In general, there
is an infinity of “risk” allocations that will allow for the transaction to take place. It is reasonable
therefore to ask which is the optimal one and through the resolution of this problem propose a
unique pricing mechanism for the claim.
As a result of undertaking some positive risk the buyer quotes a higher reservation price than
her original indifference price, while the opposite effect happens for the seller, who quotes a lower
reservation price than her original indifference price when undertaking positive risk. Should the new
reservation prices be such that the buyer’s reservation price is higher then the seller’s reservation
price, the transaction may take place.
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In the scenario we propose, we assume that each of the two agents has firm beliefs about the
future states of the world but deliberately undertakes some risk so that the transaction will be
made possible. The optimal risk allocation is defined by the solution of the optimization problem,
in which a convex combination of the risks undertaken by each of the two agents is minimized, under
the constraint that the transaction is made possible, i.e., under the constraint that the buyer’s price
is greater or equal than the seller’s price. From the unique optimal risk allocation one is led to a
unique common price for the contingent claim in question.
For the purposes of this paper we adopt the view that utility is cardinal and allows for interper-
sonal and intrapersonal comparison as is usually done in many branches of economic theory such as
social welfare theory (see e.g., [34], [44], [21] but also [27] for an opposite view), the axiomatic theory
of bargaining (see e.g., [36], [26]), the theory of coalitional bargaining ([45]) etc. Without entering
the long standing debate concerning the ordinal or cardinal nature of utilities and the problem of
strength of preferences [5], [6], [16], [37]1, we will not eschew from exploring the implications that
such an assumption has in contingent claim pricing theory in incomplete markets.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we fix ideas and notation, we present
the general setup of the market and of the agents’ risk preferences, we introduce the concept of
“loss” or “gain” of indirect utility and we extend the concept of utility indifference pricing in order
to accommodate situations of loss or gain of indirect utility. In Section 3, we deal with our main
problem of price selection in incomplete markets by imposing our risk sharing criterion which leads
to our main result, a pricing scheme, represented by an optimization problem, which we prove offers
a unique solution to the price selection problem. In Section 4, we examine in detail the example of
agents who report exponential utility, in which case we are able to provide a closed form solution
to the price selection problem and discuss further its properties. In Section 5, we summarize and
conclude, after discussing possible variations or extensions of our framework (convex risk measures,
optimal trading time, other forms of total risk) which hint at some possible directions for future
research. Finally, in the Appendix we treat the technicalities involved with utility functions that
are defined only for wealths that take values on the positive real axis.
2. The Market and the Agents
2.1. The Market. We consider an incomplete market setting over a fixed finite time horizon
T , based on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P), where the filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] satisfies
the usual conditions of right continuity and completeness. We assume that the market consists
of d + 1 tradable assets, the discounted price process of which is denoted by S = (St)t∈[0,T ] =
1 which to the best of our understanding is still not resolved completely as the literature still addresses the problem
of providing conditions under which cardinality of utility functions is feasible see e.g., [7], [8], [4], [15], [29] or even
measurable by econometric experiments [31].
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S
(0)
t , S
(1)
t , S
(2)
t , ..., S
(d)
t
)
t∈[0,T ]
. The first of these assets is considered to be riskless (the bond)
with discounted price process S
(0)
t equal to 1 at any time t ∈ [0, T ], i.e., it plays the roˆle of the
nume´raire. The other assets are risky (the stocks) with discounted price process modeled by a
Rd-valued (locally bounded) semimartingale
(
S
(1)
t , S
(2)
t , ..., S
(d)
t
)
t∈[0,T ]
on (Ω,F ,F,P).
Furthermore, we make the following assumption which ensures that our market is incomplete
and free of arbitrage opportunities (see [13]).
Assumption 2.1. The set Me := {Q ∼ P : S is local martingale under Q} is non empty and not
a singleton.
According to F. Delbaen and W. Schachermayer, [13], given a contingent claim B, the set of
non-arbitrage prices for this claim is the interval
(
inf
Q∈Me
{EQ[B]}, sup
Q∈Me
{EQ[B]}
)
. Clearly, if the
market were complete, i.e., ifMe were a singleton, this interval would degenerate to a single point,
thus leading to the unique price of the claim.
2.2. The Utility Functions. The incompleteness of the market implies the existence of contingent
claims that can not be replicated by the market assets S. Thus, an agent who includes such a non-
replicable claim in her portfolio will always face unhedgeable risk. Therefore, in this market setting,
the agent’s risk preferences play a crucial roˆle with regard to her investment decisions. We assume
that the risk preferences of an agent are modeled by some utility function on her terminal wealth
at time horizon T . Then, the agent faces the problem of maximizing the expected utility of her
terminal wealth by employing an appropriate portfolio strategy for trading in the market S (see
problems (4) and (5)).
So let us suppose that an agent decides on the basis of some utility function U : R → R that is
strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously differentiable and satisfies the Inada conditions:
lim
x→−∞
U ′(x) =: U ′(−∞) = +∞ and lim
x→+∞
U ′(x) =: U ′(+∞) = 0. (1)
Moreover, we assume that U has reasonable asymptotic elasticity, i.e.,
lim inf
x→−∞
xU ′(x)
U(x)
> 1 and lim sup
x→+∞
xU ′(x)
U(x)
< 1. (2)
As proved in [42] (see also [30]), this assumption is required for the well posedness of the utility
maximization problem of the agent.
Furthermore, it is convenient to assume that lim
x→−∞
U(x) = −∞. The notation lim
x→+∞
U(x) =
U(+∞) is also used.
2.3. The Agents and the Admissible Strategies. Consider now an agent with initial wealth
x ∈ R (measured in nume´raire units) and risk preferences that are modeled by a utility function
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U . The agent invests her initial wealth in the market assets by creating self-financing portfolios
(investment strategies), with the goal to maximize her expected utility of terminal wealth.
A self-financing portfolio for this agent is a d+1-dimensional stochastic process ϑ = (ϑt)t∈[0,T ] ,
that is predictable and S-integrable, specifying the number of units of each asset held in the portfolio
at each time t ∈ [0, T ]. Then, the wealth process X = (Xt)t∈[0,T ] that such a portfolio produces is
given as the stochastic integral Xt = (ϑ · S)t =
∫ t
0 ϑsdSs. The portfolio ϑ is called admissible if the
wealth process Xt = (ϑ · S)t that it produces is uniformly bounded from below by some constant.
Let Θ denote the set of all admissible portfolios that can be formed by this agent.
In the sequel, we use the following notation: Lp = Lp(Ω,FT ,P), 1 ≤ p < ∞, denotes the set
of equivalence classes of FT -measurable random variables X such that E[|X|
p] < ∞, where E[.]
denotes the expectation under the probability measure P; the case where p =∞ corresponds to the
essentially bounded random variables. By L0 we denote the set of FT -measurable random variables.
Assume now that the agent has a (possibly non-replicable) claim B ∈ L∞ that matures at
the fixed time horizon T . Then we define the set FU,B(x) := {F ∈ L
0 : U(F ) ∈ L1 and F ≤
x+ (ϑ ·S)T +B for some ϑ ∈ Θ} and according to M. Owen, [38], the set of attainable wealths for
this agent, which describes the wealths that she can attain at time T by employing some admissible
portfolio strategy ϑ, is given as
XU,B(x) := {X ∈ L
0 : U(x+X +B) ∈ {U(F ) : F ∈ FU,B(x)}
L1
}. (3)
Then, the problem of utility maximization that the agent faces is
u(x;B) := sup
X∈XU,B(x)
E {U (X + B)} (4)
In the special case that B = 0, the corresponding problem becomes
u(x) := sup
X∈XU (x)
E {U (X)} (5)
where, by XU (x) we denote the attainable wealths of the agent in the special case that B = 0, i.e.,
when there is no liability at the time horizon T .
The functions u(x) and u(x;B) are usually called the “indirect” utilities (the latter under the
liability B) or simply the value functions and have been studied by many authors (see e.g., [42],
[38], [39] etc.).
The next theorem due to [38] (see also [42]) states some useful properties of the indirect utility.
Theorem 2.1. (W. Schachermayer, 2001, M. Owen, 2002)
Assume that:
(i) B ∈ L∞.
(ii) Assumption 2.1 holds.
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(iii) There exists x ∈ R such that u(x;B) < U(∞).
Then, the value function u(·;B) is finitely valued, strictly increasing, strictly concave and continu-
ously differentiable on R with
lim
x→+∞
u′(x;B) = 0 and lim
x→−∞
u′(x;B) = +∞ (6)
Furthermore, there exists a solution to problem (4), i.e., the supremum in (4) is attained.
Remark 2.1. Since, u(x;B) is a strictly concave C1 (R) function of x, we obtain that du(x;B)
dx
is
strictly decreasing and its range is (0,+∞). We also observe that lim
x→−∞
u(x;B) = lim
x→−∞
U(x) = −∞
and lim
x→+∞
u(x;B) = U(+∞).
2.4. The Agents and the Indifference Price. Having defined the indirect utility functions, we
recall the notion of the seller’s and buyer’s indifference price for the given claim B ∈ L∞. The
seller’s indifference price, v(s) (B), is given as the unique solution of
u(x) = u
(
x+ v(s) (B) ;−B
)
(7)
while the corresponding buyer’s indifference price, v(b) (B), solves
u(x) = u
(
x− v(b) (B) ;B
)
(8)
Indifference pricing has been examined by several authors (see e.g., [23], [10], [40], [35], [28]
etc.). It can be shown that both indifference prices are non-arbitrage prices, i.e., they belong to
the interval
(
inf
Q∈Me
{EQ[B]}, sup
Q∈Me
{EQ[B]}
)
(see among others [39], Proposition 7.2) and when B
is replicable, they are both equal to the unique non-arbitrage price EQ[B], for some Q ∈Me.
The indifference pricing rule provides the agents with subjective reference prices of the claim
B ∈ L∞. An agent who reports this pricing rule is willing to sell the claim B at any price P such
that v(s) (B) ≤ P . In particular, if the agent sells the claim B at a price P strictly greater than
v(s) (B), then the seller has “gained” some indirect utility. Similarly, the agent is willing to buy the
claim B at any price P such that v(b) (B) ≥ P , while again a strict inequality transaction results in
a “gain” of indirect utility to the buyer. On the other hand, selling claim B for a price P < v(s) (B)
or buying claim B for a price P > v(b) (B) results in a “loss” of indirect utility.
Although a transaction that does not cause any “loss” of indirect utility to any of the transacting
agents sounds natural, it seems that the existence of transactions that may result in some “loss”
of indirect utility may be in need of some defense. The following motivating examples try to serve
this purpose, although we should emphasize that the acceptance of loss of indirect utility is used in
the sequel as a means for pricing and could better be interpreted as departure from the benchmark
utility function.
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Example 2.1. A company C owns two subsidiaries S1 and S2. For some reason (e.g., internal
politics, book-keeping, tax purposes) the top management of C is convinced that it would be
beneficial for C if S1 and S2 perform a transaction on a structured claim B with S1 acting as the
buyer and S2 acting as the seller of the claim. The mother company C is not interested in the exact
price at which the transaction will take place, as long as it is a non-arbitrage price, and so it “orders”
the management of S1 and S2 to perform the transaction at a price convenient to them. However,
the managers of the subsidiaries are naturally concerned about the price of the transaction. Let
v(b)(B), v(s)(B) be the indifference prices of S1 and S2 respectively. If v(b)(B) < v(s)(B) then, since
S1 and S2 are forced to perform the transaction, at least one of them will lose some indirect utility
(most probably they will both lose some indirect utility as the bargaining procedure may eventually
lead to a price P such that v(b)(B) < P < v(s)(B)).
Example 2.2. Suppose that two investment companies I1 and I2 are interested in transacting on a
claim B, the one acting as the buyer of the claim and the other acting as the seller of the claim. The
investment company I1 has an investment committee that is to decide on the pricing of the claim B.
The committee members have utility functions U1, ..., Uk. After extensive discussion, they decide
to use for pricing purposes the maximin or Rawlsian (see [41]) utility function U = min(U1, ...Uk),
so that all members will be happy. Let v(b)(B) the resulting indifference price. In a similar
manner the investment committee of the seller has reached to an indifference price v(s)(B). If
v(b)(B) < v(s)(B), the transaction cannot take place unless some risk (utility-wise) is undertaken.
Notice that the notion of risk to be undertaken refers to departure from the indifference prices,
which however were calculated according to the “conservative” minimum utility function. It is
probable that a majority of the investment committee, consisting of members that are indifferent
with less favorable prices, will insist on some departure from the benchmark.
Example 2.3. An employer E offers a bonus scheme to an employee M, which is agreed to have
a fixed value C at time zero. The bonus consists of two parts: the first one is a contingent non-
replicable claim B maturing at time T . The second part of the bonus is just the lump cash amount
that remains after subtracting the time zero value of B from the total value C. Therefore, the value
C of the bonus is the sum of the time zero value of B and whatever remains in cash; however, the
time zero value of B is clearly negotiable. In this sense, the time zero value of B is the price at
which the employer “sells” the claim to the employee, who in turn “buys” it from the employer. It
is clear that the price of B is important and the two counter-parties may find that it is mutually
beneficial to reach an agreement on the price of B even if some loss of indirect utility is needed.
The above examples indicate that in certain cases we need to extend the notion of the utility
indifference pricing to accommodate situations of loss or gain of indirect utility. Let us fix a
contingent claim Bˆ ∈ L∞ and following [47] consider an agent with utility function U that faces
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Bˆ at time T and is compensated at time 0 by the certain amount Pˆ ∈ R. We define her loss of
indirect utility by the quantity:
ε := u (x)− u
(
x+ Pˆ ;Bˆ
)
. (9)
Clearly, when Bˆ = −B, Pˆ =: P corresponds to the “reservation price” stated by the seller of the
claim B, when a suboptimal decision leading to indirect utility differing by ε from the optimal level
is taken. On the other hand, when Bˆ = B, Pˆ =: −P corresponds to the buyer’s side.
Alternatively, one can define the function P (s) (ε), which gives the exact price under which the
loss of indirect utility for the seller is ε. In other words, P (s) (ε) is given implicitly as the solution
of the equation
ε = u (x)− u
(
x+ P (s) (ε) ;−B
)
(10)
Similarly, for the buyer’s side, P (b) (ε) is given as the solution of the equation
ε = u (x)− u
(
x− P (b) (ε) ;B
)
(11)
Notice that P (b) (0) = v(b) (B) and P (s) (0) = v(s) (B) and in general both P (s)(ε) and P (b)(ε)
depend on the initial wealth x.
2.5. The Functions P (s) (.) and P (b) (.). To study the properties of P (s) (.) and P (b) (.), we need
to introduce the following notation: For every utility, U , and for every initial wealth, x ∈ R, we
define
AU,x := (u (x)− u (+∞) ,+∞) = (u (x)− U (+∞) ,+∞) (12)
where u(x) is the corresponding indirect utility given in (5). We also define the function ϕ(.;B) :
(−∞, U (+∞))→ R by
ϕ(y;B) := u−1 (y;B) , for y ∈ (−∞, U (+∞)) . (13)
ϕ(y;B) is well-defined on account of Theorem 2.1.
Using the above definitions, the solutions of equations (10) and (11) are given by
P (s) (ε) =
{
ϕ (u (x)− ε;−B)− x, if ε ∈ AU,x,
+∞, if ε ≤ u (x)− U (+∞)
(14)
and
P (b) (ε) =
{
x− ϕ (u (x)− ε;B) , if ε ∈ AU,x,
−∞, if ε ≤ u (x)− U (+∞)
(15)
where lim
ε→+∞
P (s) (ε) = −∞ and lim
ε→+∞
P (b) (ε) = +∞.
We should point out that although the indifference prices (i.e., P (s)(0) and P (b)(0)) are non-
arbitrage prices, the values P (s)(ε) and P (b)(ε) may lie outside the interval of non-arbitrage prices(
inf
Q∈Me
{EQ (B)}, sup
Q∈Me
{EQ (B)}
)
for certain values of ε. In fact, P (s)(AU,x) = P
(b)(AU,x) = R for
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any pair of initial wealths x ∈ R and utility functions U . By (14) and (15), P (s)(ε) is within the
interval of non-arbitrage prices for those ε’s that belong to the interval(
u (x)− u( sup
Q∈Me
{EQ(B)}+ x;−B), u (x)− u( inf
Q∈Me
{EQ (B)}+ x;−B)
)
(16)
and P (b)(ε) is within the interval of non-arbitrage prices for those ε’s that belong to the interval(
u (x)− u(x− inf
Q∈Me
{EQ(B)};B), u (x)− u(x− sup
Q∈Me
{EQ (B)};B)
)
(17)
The following proposition establishes some useful properties of the functions P (s) and P (b).
Proposition 2.1. For a given claim B ∈ L∞ and initial wealth x ∈ R, P (s) (P (b)) is a continuously
differentiable, strictly decreasing (increasing) and strictly convex (concave) function of ε on AU,x.
Proof. We restrict our attention to P (s), since the proof for P (b) follows along the same lines. The
fact that P (s) ∈ C1 (AU,x) follows directly from the definition of P
(s) and Theorem 2.1. Let us now
consider ε1,ε2 ∈ AU,x such that ε1 < ε2. Then,
ε1 = u (x)− u
(
x+ P (s) (ε1) ;−B
)
< ε2 = u (x)− u
(
x+ P (s) (ε2) ;−B
)
hence P (s) (ε1) > P
(s) (ε2), because u (x;−B) is strictly increasing for x ∈ R.
For the convexity, let us take any λ ∈ (0, 1) and some ε1,ε2 ∈ AU,x, with ε1 6= ε2. Then,
λε1 + (1− λ) ε2 = u(x)− u
(
x+ P (s) (λε1) + (1− λε2);−B
)
,
but also
λε1 + (1− λ) ε2 = u(x)− λu
(
x+ P (s)(ε1);−B
)
− (1− λ)u
(
x+ P (s)(ε2);−B
)
.
Therefore,
u
(
x+ P (s) (λε1) + (1− λε2);−B
)
= λu
(
x+ P (s)(ε1);−B
)
− (1− λ)u
(
x+ P (s)(ε2);−B
)
and by the strict convexity of u(x;−B) we have
u
(
x+ P (s) (λε1 + (1− λ) ε2) ;−B
)
< u
(
x+ λP (s) (ε1) + (1− λ)P
(s) (ε2) ;−B
)
which gives that
P (s) (λε1 + (1− λ) ε2) < λP
(s) (ε1) + (1− λ)P
(s) (ε2) .
This completes the proof. 
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3. The Risk Sharing Pricing Scheme
In this Section, we deal with the main problem of this paper. Consider a fixed claim B ∈ L∞
and two financial agents whose risk preferences are modeled by utility functions that satisfy the
properties listed in subsection 2.2 (or the ones in subsection A.1). One of them is supposed to be
the seller of B, while the other is the buyer. In other words, we suppose that at time T , the seller
will face the liability −B payable to the buyer, as a result of receiving some certain amount P ∈ R
at time 0 by the buyer. On the other hand, the buyer will receive the payoff B at time T , as a
result of paying P to the seller at time 0. Given that the transaction has to take place,
How should price P be determined?
Before we give our proposed answer, we need some further notation. Let Us and Ub denote the
utility functions of the seller and the buyer respectively, u(s)(.;−B), u(b)(.;B) their indirect utilities,
xs, xb ∈ R their initial wealths and P
(s)(.), P (b)(.) their respective pricing functions. Furthermore,
we set As := AUs,xs and Ab := AUb,xb . Since both agents are considered to be utility maximizers
(i.e., they both encounter problems of the form (4) and (5)), it is reasonable to expect that they
give value to non-replicable contingent claims using the indifference pricing rule. Then, two cases
are possible, namely, v(s)(B) ≤ v(b)(B) and v(s)(B) > v(b)(B). In the former case, the indifference
pricing rule leads to an agreement price (see [3] for the exact definition of agreement and [24] for
a relevant discussion), in the sense that there is a price P ∈ [v(s)(B), v(b)(B)], the transaction at
which implies gain in terms of indirect utility for at least one of the agents. However, determination
of the exact price P at which the transaction will take place needs an extra criterion. In the latter
situation, the indifference pricing rule implies no agreement between the agents, in other words,
transaction at any price leads to loss of indirect utility for at least one of the agents. Hence even in
this case, provided though that the agents have to proceed to the transaction, a criterion is needed
in order to determine the exact price at which the transaction will take place.
A desired criterion (common in both cases) can be given through the functions P (s)(.) and P (b)(.).
For this, we consider the following minimization problem
min
(εs,εb)∈As×Ab
{λεs + (1− λ)εb} (18)
subject to P (s) (εs) ≤ P
(b) (εb)
where, λ ∈ (0, 1) and εs, εb are the loss (gain) of indirect utilities of the seller and the buyer
respectively. Assuming the existence of a solution (ε∗s, ε
∗
b) of (18), we are then able to define a
commonly agreed price, P = P ∗, for the claim B by
P ∗ := P (s)(ε∗s) = P
(b)(ε∗b )
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In words, according to the above scenario, the agents will proceed to the transaction on claim
B when a convex combination (a weighted average) of their loss of indirect utilities is minimized.
This convex combination corresponds to an allocation, between the two agents, of the total risk
needed for the completion of the transaction. As Theorem 3.1 states, the uniqueness of the solution
provides a unique price P ∗, which will be called the risk sharing price of the claim B (see Definition
3.1 below) of these two agents.
The following theorem provides the existence and the uniqueness of the solution to the mini-
mization problem (18).
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumption 2.1, for any choice of utilities Us and Ub and for every weight
λ ∈ (0, 1), the minimization problem (18) has a unique solution (ε∗s , ε
∗
b) ∈ As ×Ab, which provides
a unique price P ∗ = P (s) (ε∗s) = P
(b) (ε∗b).
Proof. First, notice that in (18), the inequality in the constraint can be replaced by the equality
P (s) (εs) = P
(b) (εb). Indeed, if (ε¯s, ε¯b) ∈ As×Ab minimizes λεs+(1−λ)εb and P
(s) (ε¯s) < P
(b) (ε¯b),
there exists δ > 0 such that ε¯s − δ ∈ As and P
(s) (ε¯s − δ) = P
(b) (ε¯b) ∈ R (since P
(s) is strictly
decreasing and sup{P (s)(ε) : ε ∈ As} = +∞). But then λ (ε¯s − δ) + (1 − λ)ε¯b < λε¯s + (1 − λ)ε¯b,
which is a contradiction.
Now, since P (s) (P (b)) is in C1(As) (C
1(Ab)), we apply the Lagrange multiplier method in order
to solve (18). To this end, we define the Lagrangian L : As ×Ab × R → R
L(εs, εb,m) = λεs + (1− λ)εb +m
(
P (s) (εs)− P
(b) (εb)
)
and we are looking for the triples (εs, εb,m) that solve the following system
∂L
∂εs
=
∂L
∂εb
=
∂L
∂m
= 0
or equivalently
(P (s))′ (εs) = −
λ
m
(19)
(P (b))′ (εb) =
(1− λ)
m
(20)
P (s) (εs) = P
(b) (εb) (21)
Since P (s) is strictly decreasing and P (b) is strictly increasing, we can restrict ourselves to m ∈ R∗+.
Thanks to the representations (14) and (15) of the functions P (s) and P (b) with respect to the
indirect utilities, equations (19) and (20) can be written as
u′s
(
xs + P
(s) (εs) ;−B
)
=
m
λ
(22)
u′b
(
xb − P
(b) (εb) ;B
)
=
m
(1− λ)
(23)
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since
(P (s))′ (ε) = −ϕ′s (us (xs)− ε;−B) = −
1
u′s
(
xs + P (s) (ε) ;−B
) for every ε ∈ As
and
(P (b))′ (ε) = −
1
u′b
(
xb − P (b) (ε) ;B
) for every ε ∈ Ab.
By Theorem 2.1 (see also Remark 2.1), we have that for every m ∈ R∗+ and λ ∈ (0, 1), there
exists a unique k (m) ∈ R such that
u′s (k (m) ;−B) =
m
λ
,
and since P (s) (As) = R, there exists a unique ε
∗
s (m) ∈ As for which (22) holds. Similarly for the
buyer, for every m ∈ R∗+ and λ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique ε
∗
b (m) ∈ Ab that solves equation (23).
The Lagrange multiplier m has to be assigned the value m∗, so that the constraint holds, that is
P (s) (ε∗s (m
∗)) = P (b) (ε∗b (m
∗)) (24)
Since, ε∗s (m) and ε
∗
b (m) are strictly increasing and continuous (because us, ub are), P
(s) (ε∗s (m))
is strictly decreasing and continuous and P (b) (ε∗b (m)) is strictly increasing and continuous as func-
tions of m. Now, to establish that (24) has a unique solution, it is enough to ensure that
lim
m→0
P (s) (ε∗s (m)) > lim
m→0
P (b) (ε∗b (m)) (25)
and
lim
m→+∞
P (s) (ε∗s (m)) < lim
m→+∞
P (b) (ε∗b (m)) . (26)
Indeed, we have
lim
m→0
P (s) (ε∗s (m)) = lim
m→+∞
P (b) (ε∗b (m)) = +∞ (27)
lim
m→0
P (b) (ε∗b (m)) = lim
m→+∞
P (s) (ε∗s (m)) = −∞ (28)
and therefore the required inequalities (25) and (26) hold for any choice of utilities and hence there
exists a unique m∗ ∈ R∗+, which solves (24). Given m
∗, ε∗s = ε
∗
s (m
∗) and ε∗b = ε
∗
b (m
∗) solve (19)
and (20) respectively. The fact that (ε∗s, ε
∗
b) is then indeed the unique minimizer of (18) is a direct
consequence of the strict convexity of L (εs, εb,m) on (εs, εb), for any given m. 
Thanks to the uniqueness of the solution of (18), we are able to define the risk sharing price as
follows.
Definition 3.1. The price P ∗ = P (s) (ε∗s) = P
(b) (ε∗b), where (ε
∗
s, ε
∗
b ) is the solution of problem (18)
is called the risk sharing price of claim B for the two agents.
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Remark 3.1. Using the notation X(s)(P (s)(ε)) := argmax
X∈XUs,−B(xs+P
(s)(ε))
E [Us (X −B)], equation
(10) can be written as
E
[
Us
(
X(s)(P (s)(ε)) −B
)]
= us(xs)− ε.
Then, we define the seller’s residual risk of claim B at price P (see also [35]) as
R(s)(P ) := X(s)(P )−B. (29)
Similarly, the buyer’s residual risk of claim B at P is defined as the difference X(b)(−P )+B. Then
problem (18) is equivalent to maximization of
λE[Us(R
(s)(P (s))(εs))] + (1− λ)E[Ub(R
(b)(P (b))(εb))] (30)
Equation (30) describes the total utility in terms of residual risks. The price P ∗ is the maximizer of
(30) and corresponds to the optimal residual risk allocation according to the sharing rule λ. This
provides a clarification of the terminology that we used in Definition 3.1.
Remark 3.2. The risk sharing parameter λ decides how the risk is going to be distributed be-
tween the two agents. The roˆle of parameter λ is twofold: On the one hand, it reflects the relative
bargaining power between the two agents, while on the other hand, it may serve as an adjust-
ment parameter allowing for the interpersonal comparison of utilities (if that has not already been
accounted for, by the cardinality properties of the utility functions). In this paper, we consider
λ as exogenously given (e.g., by some authorities or by policy makers or even by some mutual
agreement). It would be interesting to examine the possibility of determining λ in an endogenous
manner, for example as the equilibrium of a properly designed game; however, this is clearly beyond
the scope of this work.
The following proposition discusses the effect of parameter λ on the risk sharing price.
Proposition 3.1. The utility sharing price P ∗ is strictly decreasing and continuous function of
λ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. We first show that P ∗ is strictly decreasing with respect to λ. Consider two strictly positive
numbers λ1 < λ2 < 1. Since u
′
s(·; − B) and P
(s)(·) are strictly decreasing functions (see Theorem
2.1), equation (22) implies that ε∗s,λ1(m) > ε
∗
s,λ2
(m), for every m ∈ R+, where ε
∗
s,λ(m) denotes the
solution the equation (22). Similar arguments imply ε∗b,λ1(m) < ε
∗
b,λ2
(m),∀m ∈ R+, where ε
∗
b,λ(m)
denotes the solution of equation (23). Therefore,
P (s)(ε∗s,λ1(m)) < P
(s)(ε∗s,λ2(m)) and P
(b)(ε∗b,λ1(m)) < P
(b)(ε∗b,λ2(m))
for every m, hence by (24), we obtain the desired monotonicity property of P ∗ with respect to λ.
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The continuity with respect to λ is an easy consequence of Berge’s maximum theorem; Indeed
Berge’s theorem (see e.g., [1], Theorem 16.31) guarantees the upper semicontinuity of the corre-
spondence P ∗λ . Since, the solution of the problem is unique, this correspondence is single-valued,
hence continuous. 
Since, the functions P (s) and P (b) have unbounded ranges (see (14) and (15)), one can observe
that for values of λ close enough to 0 or 1, it may be the case that P ∗ lies outside the interval of
non-arbitrage prices for B (see for example (40) for γs = γb). This can be seen as an inconsistency,
the resolution of which requires that lower and upper bounds are imposed on λ, which intuitively
means that “extreme” loss (or gain) of utilities is not allowed.
In the light of Proposition 3.1, there exists a continuous function b(.) (which in fact is the inverse
of P ∗ as a function of λ) such that
g < P ∗ < G ⇔ b(g) < λ < b(G) (31)
In particular, the risk sharing price P ∗ is a non-arbitrage if and only if the weight of the pricing
scheme λ belongs in the interval (b( inf
Q∈Me
{EQ[B]}), b( sup
Q∈Me
{EQ[B]})).
Remark 3.3. Notice the formal similarity of problem (18) with Hicks’ expenditure minimization
problem ([34], Chapter 3). In our setting, risk plays the roˆle of expenditure, λ and 1 − λ play
the roˆle of the prices, while the price functions P (s) and P (b) play the roˆle of utilities. Through
this similarity, we may clarify the effect of λ on the risk sharing price P ∗. Furthermore, one can
consider the dual problem, namely the utility maximization, which in our framework corresponds
to the maximization of the difference of the reservation prices of the two agents, given the total
quantity of the risk undertaken.
Remark 3.4. The risk sharing pricing scheme as provided by the solution of (18), gives a price
for B traded at t = 0; it can be extended to include the case where the claim can be traded at any
time t ∈ [0, T ].
The utility maximization problems (4) and (5) can be naturally expressed in a dynamic way, i.e.,
for any time t ∈ [0, T ], we consider the problem
u(x, t;B) := sup
X∈XU,B(x,t)
E[U (X + B) | Ft] (32)
where XU,B(x, t) is defined similarly as in (3), taking into account the market conditions from time
t onwards and x is the agent’s (random) wealth at time t. Using the notation u(x, t) = u(x, t;0),
we can define the loss of indirect utility at time t of the writer and the buyer of the given claim B,
by
εs,t := u (x, t)− u (x+ P, t;−B) and εb,t := u (x, t)− u (x− P, t;B) , (33)
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so that the reservation prices for the seller and the buyer at time t given that “risk” ε is undertaken
is given by the solutions of the equations
ε = u (x, t)− u
(
x+ P
(s)
t (ε), t; −B
)
and ε = u (x, t)− u
(
x− P
(b)
t (ε), t;B
)
.
Hence, we can consider the family of minimization problems
min
(εs,εb)∈As,t×Ab,t
{λεs + (1− λ)εb} (34)
subject to P
(s)
t (εs) ≤ P
(b)
t (εb)
where, As,t := (us (xs, t)− U (+∞) ,+∞) and Ab,t := (ub (xb, t)− U (+∞) ,+∞).
By similar assumptions and arguments as in problem (18), one can conclude the existence of
(unique) solutions P ∗t for the family of problems (34).
Instead of providing the proof for the above arguments, which follows closely that of Theorem
3.1, we prefer to give a representative example of how problem (34) can be used to determine the
price of claims that can be traded at any time before maturity in Section 4.
4. The Case of the Exponential Utility
The exponential utility, defined as U(x) = −e−γx, where γ > 0 is the risk aversion coefficient, is
a widely used utility function in the literature, because it offers closed form solutions to a variety
of utility maximization problems. In this Section, we show that in the case where the agents report
exponential utilities, problem (18) can be solved explicitly, thus leading to a closed form expression
for the risk sharing price P ∗. This allows us to perform a detailed analysis of the properties of P ∗.
In the special case of the exponential utility, the problem of choosing the set of admissible
strategies Θ simplifies considerably to
Θexp :=
{
ϑ : (ϑ · S)t∈[0,T ] is a true-martingale under any Q ∈Me,f
}
where Me,f := {Q ∈Me : H(Q|P) < +∞} (assumed to be non-empty) and H(Q|P) is the relative
entropy with respect to the probability measure P, which is defined as follows
H(Q|P) =
E
[
dQ
dP
ln
(
dQ
dP
)]
, Q ≪ P,
+∞, otherwise.
(see e.g., [12], [25], [33]). The occurrence of the relative entropy in the definition of the set of the
admissible strategies is not coincidental, since as shown in [19] and [12], the entropy minimization
problem is the dual of the exponential utility maximization problem.
For every claim B ∈ L∞, the utility maximization (4) is well-defined, the supremum is attained,
the indirect utility, u(x;B) is of the form
u(x;B) = e−γxu(0;B), (35)
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is finite for every initial wealth x ∈ R, and both the optimal strategy and the indifference prices
are independent of x.
4.1. On Price P ∗ and its Properties. Let γs and γb > 0 be the seller’s and buyer’s risk aversion
coefficients respectively. Using (35), it follows that (14) and (15) simplify to
P (s) (ε) =
1
γs
ln
(
us(xs;−B)
us(xs)− ε
)
= v(s)(B)−
1
γs
ln
(
1−
ε
us(xs)
)
, for ε ∈ As = (us(xs),+∞) (36)
and
P (b) (ε) =
1
γb
ln
(
ub(xb)− ε
ub(xb;B)
)
= v(b)(B) +
1
γb
ln
(
1−
ε
ub(xb)
)
, for ε ∈ Ab = (ub(xb),+∞), (37)
where v(s)(B) and v(b)(B) denote the seller’s and the buyer’s indifference prices and us(xs), ub(xb)
their respective indirect utilities when no position on the claim B is undertaken.
Remark 4.1. Using equations (36) and (37), and straight-forward algebra, we observe that
(P (s))′(ε) =
1
γs
1
us(xs)− ε
and (P (b))′(ε) = −
1
γb
1
ub(xb)− ε
, (38)
while,
∂P (s)
∂xs
=
ε
us (xs)− ε
and
∂P (b)
∂xb
=
ε
ε− ub (xb)
,
i.e., the sensitivity of the reservation prices with respect to the risk undertaken and the initial
wealth are independent of the nature of the claim B. The above calculations indicate that, given
a loss of utility (ε > 0), a seller with greater initial wealth asks for lower prices, while given a gain
of utility (ε < 0), she asks for higher prices. Similar results can be drawn for the buyer.
For the case of exponential utility, we can solve the problem (18) explicitly.
Proposition 4.1. The risk sharing price is given by
P ∗ = P (s)(ε∗s) = P
(b)(ε∗b) =
γsv
(s)(B) + γbv
(b)(B)
γs + γb
+
1
γs + γb
ln
(
us (xs) γsλ
ub (xb) γb(1− λ)
)
(39)
Proof. Consider again the Lagrangian
L(εs, εb,m) = λεs + (1− λ)εb +m
(
P (s) (εs)− P
(b) (εb)
)
where, (εs, εb) ∈ As ×Ab and m ∈ R+. Using (38), the first order conditions yield
ε∗s (m) = us(xs) +
m
λγs
and ε∗b (m) = ub(xb) +
m
(1− λ) γb
.
The value of the Lagrange multiplier m∗ such that the constraint is satisfied is given by the solution
of the algebraic equation
P (s) (ε∗s (m
∗)) = P (b) (ε∗b(m
∗))
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which using (36) and (37) readily gives
m∗ = (−us(xs)λγs)
γb
γs+γb (−ub(xb)(1 − λ)γb)
γs
γs+γb exp
(
γsγb
γs + γb
(v(s)(B)− v(b)(B))
)
.
Therefore, the risk sharing price is
P ∗ = P (s)(ε∗s) = P
(b)(ε∗b) =
γsv
(s)(B) + γbv
(b)(B)
γs + γb
+
1
γs + γb
ln
(
us (xs) γsλ
ub (xb) γb(1− λ)
)
(40)
Since the indirect utilities have the necessary smoothness, we can conclude that the critical point
is a minimum if the determinant of the matrix
H =

∂2L
∂ε2s
(ε∗s, ε
∗
b)
∂2L
∂εs∂εb
(ε∗s, ε
∗
b)
∂φ
∂εs
(ε∗s, ε
∗
b)
∂2L
∂εs∂εb
(ε∗s, ε
∗
b)
∂2L
∂ε2
b
(ε∗s, ε
∗
b)
∂φ
∂εb
(ε∗s, ε
∗
b)
∂φ
∂εs
(ε∗s, ε
∗
b)
∂φ
∂εb
(ε∗s, ε
∗
b) 0

where φ (εs, εb) := P
(s) (εs)− P
(b) (εb) , is negative. Indeed,
‖H‖ = −P (s)′′ (ε∗s)
(1− λ)2
m∗
+
λ
m∗
P (b)′′ (ε∗b) < 0,
since P (s) is strictly convex and P (b) is strictly concave. 
Remark 4.2. In the special case where the agents have the same characteristics (xs = xb = x and
γs = γb = γ), the risk sharing price simplifies to
P ∗ =
v(s)(B) + v(b)(B)
2
+
1
2γ
ln
(
λ
1− λ
)
. (41)
Therefore, the proposed price is the midpoint between the two agents’ indifference prices plus a
correction term reflecting the risk aversion and the risk sharing rule λ. This correction becomes
zero if and only if λ = 1/2, i.e., if the risk is equally shared among the agents.
The difference between the losses of indirect utilities that lead to the price P ∗ is given by
ε∗s − ε
∗
b =
√
u (x;B)u (x;−B)
(
1− 2λ√
λ (1− λ)
)
This difference is positive for λ < 1/2, negative for λ > 1/2 and zero if λ = 1/2.
Remark 4.3. Formula (40), can easily reveal the sensitivity of the risk sharing price on the risk
aversion coefficients of the agents. Namely, P ∗ is an increasing function of γs and a decreasing
function of γb, reflecting the fact that as the seller becomes less risk averse, she is willing to ask for
lower prices while the opposite happens for the bid prices of the buyer. It is also clear from (40)
that P ∗ decreases as xs increases and P
∗ increases as xb increases.
In the special case where they have the same risk aversion coefficient, i.e., γs = γb = γ, P
∗ is
an increasing function of γ when λ < 1/2 and decreasing when λ > 1/2. For λ = 1/2 and for
γs = γb = γ we have that P
∗ = v
(s)(B)+v(b)(B)
2 +
xb−xs
2 , which generally is not a monotonic function
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of γ. An interesting limit is the limit as γ → 0; lim
γ→0
P ∗ = EQ(0) [B]+
xb−xs
2 , where Q
(0) is the measure
that minimizes the relative entropy H(Q|P) (see [12] on the behavior of v(s)(B) and v(b)(B) as γ
goes to zero).
Remark 4.4. Explicit bounds on λ can be provided such that the risk sharing price is a non-
arbitrage price; Using equation (40), one can see through straight-forward calculations that
b( inf
Q∈Me
{EQ[B]}) < λ < b( sup
Q∈Me
{EQ[B]}), where
b(a) =
K(a)
K(a) + 1
,
withK(a) = ea(γs+γb)MB(xs, xb, γs, γb) andMB(xs, xb, γs, γb) = e
(−γs(v(s)(B)−xs)−γb(v
(b)(B)+xb)) γbub(0)
γsus(0)
.
These explicit bounds allow us to draw some interesting conclusions. For example, by keeping the
rest of the parameters constant, we get that as γs (γb) goes to zero, the function
K(a)
K(a)+1 goes to
one (zero), for every a ∈ R, i.e., as an agent reduces her aversion level, her loss of utility weight
approaches one.
4.2. Example: A European Claim on a Non-traded Asset. In this Section, we build on the
model proposed in [35], concerning the utility pricing of a European claim written on a non-traded
asset. This model considers two traded assets, a riskless one (the nume´raire) and a risky one, whose
discounted price St follows the dynamics
dSt = µStdt+ σStdW
(1)
t
where W
(1)
t∈[0,T ] is a standard Wiener process, µ ∈ R and σ ∈ R
∗
+. It further assumes the existence
of a non-traded asset, whose discounted price dynamics follow the stochastic differential equation
dYt = b(Yt, t)dt + a(Yt, t)
(
ρdW
(1)
t + ρ
′dW
(2)
t
)
where (W
(2)
t )t∈[0,T ] is another standard Wiener process (independent of W
(1)
t ). The constant ρ ∈
(−1, 1) is the correlation coefficient between the factors driving the dynamics of the prices of the
traded and the non-traded asset.
Consider now a European contingent claim B, whose payoff depends on the value YT of the non-
traded asset at time T , through g(YT ), where g : R → R is a bounded Borel function, so that
B ∈ L∞. In [35], expressions for indirect utilities and the bid and ask indifference prices in the case
of exponential utilities are stated. In general, these prices do not lead to an agreement concerning
a commonly acceptable price at which the option can be traded. We now propose an alternative
approach to this problem using the definition of the risk sharing price as extended in Remark 3.4.
The following theorem, which quotes the relevant results of [35] concerning the indirect utilities
achieved, needed in this work, is included to enhance the readability of the present paper.
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Theorem 4.1. (M. Musiela and T. Zariphopoulou, 2004)
Let Q(0) be the minimal relative entropy martingale probability measure and
X˜exp(x, t) := {x+
∫ T
t
ϑudSu : for (ϑu)u∈[t,T ] such that E
[∫ T
t
ϑ2udu
]
<∞}.
Then,
(i) The indirect utility of an agent with no position on the contingent claim is
u(x, t) = sup
X∈ eXexp(x,t)
E
[
−e−γX
∣∣Ft] = −e−γx e−µ2(T−t)2σ2
(ii) The indirect utility for the seller, u(x, y, t;− g(YT )), is given by
u(x, y, t; − g(YT )) = −e
−γsx
(
EQ(0)
[
eγs(1−ρ
2)g(YT )e−
(1−ρ2)µ2(T−t)
2σ2
∣∣∣∣Yt = y,Ft]) 1(1−ρ2)
(iii) The indirect utility for the buyer, u(x, y, t;g(YT )), is given by
u(x, y, t;g(YT )) = −e
−γb x
(
EQ(0)
[
e−γb(1−ρ
2)g(YT )e−
(1−ρ2)µ2(T−t)
2σ2
∣∣∣∣Yt = y,Ft]) 1(1−ρ2) .
For details on the measure Q(0), we refer the interested reader to Theorem 2 of [35].
We are now able to characterize the price functions P (s) and P (b) and the risk sharing price at
time t .
Proposition 4.2.
(i) The seller’s price P
(s)
t (ε) is given by
P
(s)
t (ε) = v
(s)
t (B)−
1
γs
ln
(
1 + εδ
(s)
t
)
where
v
(s)
t (B) =
1
(1− ρ2)γs
ln
(
EQ(0)
[
eγs(1−ρ
2)g(YT )
∣∣∣Yt = y,Ft])
is the seller’s indifference price at time t and δ
(s)
t := e
γs xs+
µ2(T−t)
2σ2 .
(ii) The buyers price P
(b)
t (ε) is given by
P
(b)
t (ε) = v
(b)
t (B) +
1
γb
ln
(
1 + εδ
(b)
t
)
where
v
(b)
t (B) = −
1
(1− ρ2)γb
ln
(
EQ(0)
[
e−γb(1−ρ
2)g(YT )
∣∣∣Yt = y,Ft])
is the buyer’s indifference price at time t and δ
(b)
t := e
γb xb+
µ2(T−t)
2σ2 .
(iii) The risk sharing price P ∗t for any time t ∈ [0, T ], is given by
P ∗t =
γsv
(s)
t (B) + γbv
(b)
t (B)
γs + γb
+
1
γs + γb
ln
(
γsλδ
(b)
t
γb(1− λ)δ
(s)
t
)
(42)
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Proof. Using (14) and (15) and Theorem 4.1, the proof of (i) and (ii) is straight-forward.
Taking into account Theorem 4.1 and the formula (40), we obtain the solution of the dynamic
version of problem (34) as stated in (iii). 
Remark 4.5. The function P
(s)
t (ε) can be considered as a function of time t and the market
condition at this time, y = Yt, and as such it can be shown to be the solution of a deterministic
quasilinear PDE. For fixed ε, define
P
(s)
t (ε) := P
(s)(y, t) :=
1
γs(1− ρ2)
lnΦ(s)(y, t).
Using the Feynman-Kac representation one may show by extension of the arguments in [35], that
Φ(s)(y, t) is the solution of the linear backward Cauchy problem
∂Φ(s)
∂t
+
1
2
a(y, t)2
∂2Φ(s)
∂y2
+
(
b(y, t)−
ρµ
σ
a(y, t)
) ∂Φ(s)
∂y
+
R(s)′(t)
R(s)(t)
Φ(s) = 0
where
Φ(s)(y, T ) :=
eγs(1−ρ
2)g(y)
(1 + εeγsxs)(1−ρ2)
,
and
R(s)(t) := (1 + εδ
(s)
t )
(1−ρ2).
By straight-forward algebraic manipulation, one may show that the price is the solution of a
quasilinear deterministic PDE of the form
∂P (s)
∂t
+
1
2
a(y, t)2
∂2P (s)
∂y2
+
(
b(y, t)−
ρµ
σ
a(y, t)
) ∂P (s)
∂y
+
1
2
γs(1− ρ
2)a(y, t)2
(
∂P (s)
∂y
)2
+ Λ(s)′(t) = 0
with final condition
P (s)(y, T ) = g(y) −
1
γs
ln(1 + εeγsxs)
where
Λ(s)(t) :=
1
γs
ln(1 + εδ
(s)
t ).
The indifference prices are recovered when setting R(s)(t) = 0 and Λ(s)(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] in
the above PDEs. Similar arguments give a quasilinear PDE for the evolution of the buyer’s price
after undertaking some risk. However, even though the risk sharing price is a linear combination of
the indifference prices plus the addition of a known factor depending only on time, the quasilinear
nature of the PDEs that the indifference prices satisfy do not allow us to write down a single PDE
that the risk sharing price as a function of Yt = y and t, will satisfy.
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5. Extensions, Directions for future research and Conclusion
In this Section, we discuss some possible extensions of the pricing scheme proposed in this paper
and conclude.
5.1. Risk Sharing Price Using Risk Measures. Consider that the agents model their risk
preferences using convex risk measures ρs and ρb respectively, rather than expected utility functions.
Since they have access to a liquid market, their investment goal is to minimize their risk, as
quantified by the risk measures employed, by trading into this market. More precisely, for a
contingent claim B, the agents’ marketed risk measures (as defined in [18], [48], [20]) are given by
ρˆs(xs;B) := inf
X∈X (xs)
ρs(X +B) and ρˆb(xb;B) := inf
X∈X (xb)
ρb(X +B).
Along the lines of equations (10) and (11), we can define the analogous of the reservation prices
P (s) and P (b), when the risk is represented by ρˆs and ρˆb, as the solutions of the following equations
εs = −ρˆs(xs; 0) + ρˆs(xs + P
(s)(εs);−B) and εb = −ρˆb(xb; 0) + ρˆb(xb − P
(b)(εb);B).
Using these definitions and similar arguments as in Section 3, we define a pricing scheme as dictated
by the solution of the minimization problem (18). Clearly, the convexity of the risk measures
guarantees that problem (18) is well-posed. Notice however, that if the marketed risk measures are
cash invariant, the above general arguments may break down since then problem (18) is equivalent
to the minimization of
λεs + (1− λ)εb = c(B) + P
(s)(εs)(2λ − 1) (43)
under the constraint P (s)(εs) = P
(b)(εb), where c(B) := −λ(ρˆs(0; 0)− ρˆs(0;−B))−(1−λ)(ρˆb(0; 0)−
ρˆb(0;B)) which is ill-posed.
However, this is not a problem, since even though the risk measures ρs and ρb are by definition
cash invariant, the corresponding property for the marketed risk measures requires that X (x+y) =
X (x)+y, for every possible initial wealths x and y. This clearly does not hold in most cases of some
practical interest, as for instance when borrowing constraints are imposed. Therefore in general,
minimization of λεs+ (1−λ)εb is a well-defined problem leading to meaningful risk sharing prices.
5.2. Optimal Trading Time. The family of risk sharing prices for the asset at time t as given
by equation (42) is clearly a stochastic process, on account of the stochastic nature of Yt. One may
at the cost of considerable algebraic manipulations, apply Itoˆ’s rule and determine the evolution of
the process P ∗t as a stochastic differential equation. For every time t ∈ [0, T ] the price P
∗
t , as given
by equation (42), is the price corresponding to the minimal total risk that the two agents have
to undertake, at any time t, so that the transaction may take place. However, this total risk is a
stochastic process itself since it depends on the market conditions at time t. We may then consider
the stochastic process ε∗t := λε
∗
s,t + (1 − λ)ε
∗
b,t = E(t, Yt) which is the minimal total risk allowing
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the transaction at time t. The function E is a deterministic function the form of which is known
explicitly (see Proposition 4.1). In principle, a straight-forward application of Itoˆ’s lemma gives
us the stochastic differential equation this process satisfies. One may now consider the following
problem: Suppose that we can find a stopping time τ ∈ [0, T ] such that the expectation of the total
risk ε∗τ is minimized, over all such stopping times. When choosing to trade the contingent claim at
this time, clearly both agents undertake the minimum possible total expected risk. We may then
define this time τ as the optimal trading time for the contract, and the price P ∗τ is then the optimal
trading price. The resolution of this problem can be based on optimal stopping techniques, using
variational inequalities, the solution of which will help us to determine the optimal stopping rule.
5.3. Different Forms of the Total Risk. The expression of the total risk undertaken by the
agents, can be generalized to λψs(εs) + (1− λ)ψb(εb), where λ ∈ (0, 1) and ψs(.), ψb(.) are strictly
convex increasing functions. We then may consider the problem
min
(εs,εb)∈As×Ab
{λψs(εs) + (1− λ)ψb(εb)} (44)
subject to P (s) (εs) ≤ P
(b) (εb)
In the special case where ψs(ε) = ψb(ε) = ε, for every ε, problem (44) reduces to problem (18).
Through the solution of problem (44), we can define a risk sharing price. The solvability of (44)
follows along the same lines of the proof of Theorem 3.1.
This generalization is important in its own right, since it may offer the ground for relaxing the
cardinality assumption on the utility functions.
5.4. Conclusion. In this work, we considered two agents, a seller and a buyer, who are interested in
trading a given, non-divisible, non-replicable contingent claim. Assuming that they are determined
to complete the transaction, they need to agree on a commonly accepted price, out of the infinity of
possible non-arbitrage prices, at which the transaction will take place. The risk preferences of the
agents indicate that some risk may have to be undertaken if a common price is to be reached. We
proposed a pricing mechanism according to which the unique common price is determined by the
minimization of the total risk undertaken according to a fixed sharing rule, under the constraint
that the transaction is feasible. We proved that such a problem is well-posed and we illustrated in
detail this pricing mechanism in the special case of the exponential utility.
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Appendix A. Utility Functions on the Positive Real Line
In this Appendix, we provide the necessary technical details that guarantee the validity of our
results in the case where one or both agents has utility function defined on the positive real line.
A.1. Assumptions on the Utility Functions. The second type of utilities includes the functions
that are defined only for positive wealth, i.e.,
U : R+→ R
where we set U(x) = −∞ for every x < 0. U is taken to be strictly increasing, strictly concave and
continuously differentiable on R+ and to satisfy the Inada conditions:
lim
x→0
U ′(x) := U ′(0) = +∞ and lim
x→+∞
U ′(x) := U ′(+∞) = 0. (45)
Moreover, we assume reasonable asymptotic elasticity for U , meaning that
lim sup
x→+∞
xU ′(x)
U(x)
< 1 (46)
(see [30], [22] and [9]). Again, U(+∞) stands for lim
x→+∞
U(x).
A.2. Admissible Strategies and Initial Wealths. For utilities that are defined only for positive
wealths, the properties of indirect utility have been given in the seminal works of D. Kramkov and
W. Schachermayer, [30], for the case of no random endowment (i.e., no random liability B) and J.
Cvitanic´, W. Schachermayer and H. Wang, [9], under the presence of random endowment. In this
case, for every initial wealth x ∈ R+, the set of admissible wealths X (x) is
X (x) = {X ∈ L0(Ω,FT ,P) : X ≤ (ϑ · S)T + x for some ϑs ∈Θ} (47)
where Θ is the set of admissible strategies given in Section 2. We also need to define the set
D := {Q ∈ (L∞)∗ : ‖Q‖ = 1 and 〈Q,X〉 ≤ 0, ∀X ∈ C} (48)
where C = Θ∩L∞ and 〈., .〉 is the duality pairing of L∞ and the space of finitely additive measures,
(L∞)∗. Finally, given any claim B ∈ L∞, we set x0(B) := sup
Q∈D
〈Q, B〉 (notice that in [13], Theorem
5.6, it is stated that Me ⊆ D).
The following theorem, quoted from [9] (Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 4.3) and [30] (Theorem 2.2)
gives the properties which are needed in the present work.
Theorem A.1. (K. Kramkov and W. Schachermayer, 1999, J. Cvitanic´, W. Schachermayer and
H. Wang, 2001)
Assume that:
(i) B ∈ L∞.
(ii) Assumption 2.1 holds (see Section 2).
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(iii) There exists y ∈ R+ such that u(y;B) < U(∞) (where u(., B) is defined (5)).
Then, there exists a unique optimal solution in the problem (5) for every x > x0(−B). Furthermore,
the value function u(·;B) is finitely valued, strictly increasing and strictly concave and continuously
differentiable on (x0(−B),+∞), u(x;B) = −∞ for every x < x0(−B) with lim
x→x0(−B)
u(x;B) = −∞.
Finally,
lim
x→+∞
u′(x;B) = 0 and lim
x→x0(−B)
u′(x;B) = ∞. (49)
Remark A.1. Since, u(x;B) is a strictly concave C1 (x0(−B),+∞) function of x, we obtain that
du(x;B)
dx
is strictly decreasing for every x > x0(−B) and its range is (0,+∞). We also observe that
lim
x→+∞
u(x;B) = U(+∞).
A.3. Utilities of Both Types and the Risk Sharing Price. Taking into account Theorem
A.1 and the intervals (16) and (17), in the case of utility functions of this type, we impose the
following assumption on the agents’ initial wealths, in order to exclude infinite valued indirect
utilities and to guarantee that the intersections of the images of the pricing rules P (s) and P (b) and
the non-arbitrage prices for the fixed claim B are not empty.
Assumption A.1. If the seller has utility of the second type, we assume that her initial wealth
xs ∈ R+ satisfies the following inequality
xs > max{x0(B), x0(B)− sup
Q∈Me
{EQ[B]}} (50)
Similarly, if the buyer has utility of the second type, we assume that her initial wealth xb ∈ R+
satisfies the following inequality
xb > max{x0(−B), x0(−B) + inf
Q∈Me
{EQ[B]}} (51)
Under the above assumptions, the pricing scheme induced by the problem (18) is valid even in
the case where one or both of the agents have utility function of the second type. More precisely, we
define the functions P (s) and P (b) in exactly the same way as in (14) and (15) with the difference that
P (s)(Axs) = (x0(B)− xs,+∞) and P
(b)(Axb) = (−∞, xb − x0(−B)) and also that limε→+∞
P (s) (ε) =
x0(B)− xs and lim
ε→+∞
P (b) (ε) = xb − x0(−B).
Without repeating the proof of Theorem 3.1, we state its modification in this slightly generalized
case.
Theorem A.2. Let Assumptions 2.1 and A.1 hold. For any choice of utilities Us, Ub (of either
type) and for any weight λ ∈ (0, 1), the minimization problem (18) has a unique solution (ε∗s , ε
∗
b) ∈
As ×Ab. This provides a unique price P
∗ = P (s) (ε∗s) = P
(b) (ε∗b).
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Remark A.2. It should be mentioned that the only difference between the proof of Theorem 3.1
and Theorem A.2 is that in the case that agents choose utility function of the second type the
limits that guarantee the existence of the Lagrange multiplier m∗ have to be modified to
lim
m→0
P (s) (ε∗s (m)) = +∞ and lim
m→0
P (b) (ε∗b (m)) = −∞
lim
m→+∞
P (s) (ε∗s (m)) = x0(B)− xs and lim
m→+∞
P (b) (ε∗b (m)) = xb − x0(−B)
(compare to limits given in (27)).
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